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Recent developments in criminology have included a revival of interest in offenders’ 
biographies and inner emotional experiences, and a stress on the importance of self-
understanding for an understanding of crime. These approaches recall discussions of 
probation practice from the 1950 to the early 1970s, in which writers sought to make 
sense of the psychoanalytic emphasis of social work training. The paper discusses the 
most striking of these efforts, by Clare Winnicott and William Jordan, and explores 
their relevance to current thinking and research on probation, in which the importance 
of the relationship between offender and supervising officer is once again receiving 
close attention. 
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MAKING SENSE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 
AND PROBATION PRACTICE 
 
 
One of the most striking developments in recent criminology is the revival of attention 
to the individual biographies of people who offend, to their inner, sometimes 
unconscious, experiences, and to the importance of emotion as source of action. This 
development has coincided with a very different tendency in probation policy and 
practice, that stresses the rational, cognitive elements in offending and the need for 
practitioners to give priority to the careful, actuarial assessment and management of 
risk. While the relationship between criminology as an academic discipline and 
probation policy and practice has varied over the past fifty years, it would be strange 
to argue that some relationship should not exist, or that the probation service has 
nothing to learn from criminology, or criminology from probation practice. The 
purpose of this paper is firstly to argue that some recent trends in criminology recall 
approaches to understanding offending and working with offenders that characterised 
the practice of probation officers in (roughly) the third quarter of the twentieth 
century. These approaches were much criticised by the most influential criminologists 
of the 1960s and 1970s, and – partly as a result – were largely abandoned as a basis 
for practice. Now that they are being revived within criminology (usually without 
acknowledgement of their resemblance to a formerly disparaged approach to the 
understanding of offenders), it may be useful to consider their implications for 
practice, and how they connect with the emerging sense within probation theory and 
research that the quality of the immediate relationship between officer and offender 
may be a crucial factor in the success or failure of interventions. 
 
Recent criminology and the revival of complex subjectivity 
 
In the first issue of the now well established and successful journal Theoretical 
Criminology, the veteran Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie (1997) described 
‘four blocks against insight’ which he attributed to the over-socialisation of social 
scientists and their consequent lack of access to their own personal experiences. He 
argued that this produced a paradoxical lack of understanding in a field of which we 
all have immediate experience: 
 
We have sinned and been sinned against, we have acted as law-breakers, as 
police, as prosecutors, as defenders, as prison guards…We…strive to control 
ourselves or others or to protect ourselves or others from still other people’s 
attempt to control us. We are all continuously torn between lust and loyalties, 
confronted with dilemmas, often ending up with regrets for our failures. There 
is so little in the field of criminology that we have not yet experienced. 
 
The problem is access to ourselves. Access, and respect for what we find 
(Christie, 1997: 14-15). 
 
Both within criminology, as in Hal Pepinsky’s (1995) advocacy of a ‘peacemaking’ as 
opposed to a war-making criminology, and in wider social theory, as in the later work 
of Anthony Giddens (1994), one can find echoes of Christie’s position. The stress of 
these writers on the importance of self-understanding as a basis for understanding 
others would have been entirely familiar to probation officers trained in the 
psychoanalytically influenced environment of the 1950s and 1960s (Vanstone, 2004: 
105); but it is a stress entirely at odds with the emphasis on behavioural 
‘competencies’ which dominated social work training from the early 1990s, and with 
the increasing tendency in probation training to define good practice solely in terms of 
adherence to organisational procedures and national standards. I will return later in the 
paper to the practical sense that could be (and has been) made of insight into oneself 
in the context of probation practice. 
 
This stress on self-understanding is one aspect of a more general tendency in 
recent criminology to reinstate the importance of understanding the complexity of 
individual experience and motivation in theorising about offending. There are several 
interlinked sources of this renewed interest in individual-level explanations. Among 
these are a revival of interest in psychoanalytic theory and its sense of a fractured, 
unstable, ‘postmodern’ identity (particularly masculine identity) (e.g. Jefferson, 1994; 
2002a); analysis of the importance of self-concept and autobiographical narrative in 
understanding desistance from offending (e.g. Maruna, 2000; Maruna et al., 2004); 
the stress on relationships and their importance for deviance or conformity 
characteristic of the work of Braithwaite (1989) and Sampson and Laub (1993); and a 
revival of interest in emotions rather than rational, cognitive processes as sources of 
action (e.g. Katz, 1988; Scheff, 1994, 1997). Gadd and Farrall (2004) provide an 
example of work that uses individual case studies of a kind that used to be familiar to 
probation officers to understand processes of desistance in the light of theories of 
narrative, masculinity, and unconscious mechanisms of defence. The authors 
conclude: 
 
The latent or unconscious meanings embedded in offenders’ narratives are as 
important as the actual words, narratives or discourses used. These 
unconscious meanings can only be ‘got at’ through in-depth interpretive work 
(Gadd and Farrall, 2004: 148). 
 
For the late John Hood-Williams, too, in his discussion of Jefferson’s 
advocacy of a ‘psychosocial’ approach in criminology, an understanding of the nature 
of masculinity requires criminologists to return to the insights of psychoanalysis, long 
neglected by a sociologically oriented criminology: ‘since there seems to be no ready 
alternative discourse to psychoanalysis that can offer an account of human subjects it 
[the approach to masculinity of Jefferson and others] also means that criminology 
must find itself engaging in debates that only a few years ago would have seemed 
desperately obscure’ (Hood-Williams, 2001: 54). And, one might add, desperately 
old-fashioned, if participants in these debates were aware of the legacy of 
psychoanalytical criminology (e.g. Friedlander, 1947; Glover, 1960) and of 
psychoanalytic ideas developed in different contexts but subsequently influential on 
probation thinking (e.g. Winnicott, 1958; Institue of Marital Studies, 1962; Pincus, 
1973 [originally published in 1962]). Despite their mandatory deployment of post-
structuralist terms like ‘discourse’ and ‘narrative’, there is little in recent 
psychoanalytically-oriented accounts with which serious-minded probation officers of 
the 1960s would not have felt at home. 
 
The ‘ treatment model’ in practice 
 
In the discussion so far I have tried to avoid asserting that the probation officers of 
that generation in fact used some adaptation of psychoanalytic theory in their routine 
practice. Though there is no doubt that they were exposed to psychoanalytic ideas in 
their initial and subsequent training, it is far less clear that these ideas were widely 
found to be useful as a basis for practice (Vanstone, 2004). It is tempting but 
potentially misleading to assume that ideas imparted in training were translated into 
practice in a straightforward way, or that contemporary writing about probation 
practice gives a reliable account of what that practice was actually like. Awareness of 
this has led some commentators to suggest that the ‘treatment model’ which Bottoms 
and McWilliams (1979) proposed to replace with their ‘non-treatment paradigm’ 
existed more in the minds of probation trainers and commentators than in the world of 
everyday practice (Raynor and Robinson, 2005). Certainly it is possible to overstate 
the dominance of a single, psychoanalytical model of offending and of probation 
intervention. Vanstone’s (2004) reading of the Probation Journal of the period shows 
that while psychoanalytically influenced accounts appeared they did not go 
unchallenged, and his interviewees repeatedly suggested that it was a struggle to make 
sense of such ideas when faced with the practical realities of everyday supervision1. 
Officers’ typical reaction was to develop ‘folk theories’ based on their experiences of 
practice, in which psychoanalytic concepts were domesticated to make them 
manageable in the probation context (Vanstone, 2004: 114-19). Even in the perhaps 
more rarefied Case Conference, while articles on probation topics were not 
uncommon, they tended, with a few notable exceptions, to avoid overtly 
psychoanalytic accounts and interpretations. But in this they resembled articles on 
other topics: psychoanalytic approaches to social work were evidently regarded with 
some suspicion as an American import (e.g. McWhinnie, 1956: 212).  
 
Casework and agency function 
 
Probably the most common theme of Case Conference papers on probation was 
whether ‘casework’ was possible given the probation officer’s legal authority over the 
client. By the late 1950s most contributors took the view that it was, sometimes 
relying on an analogy between supervision and good parenting (Newton, 1958). 
Waldron (1957: 159), for example, argued that some dependency on the part of the 
client was inevitable in casework, and that with the development of the service the 
probation officer had come to use casework methods, ‘at the same time exploding the 
belief, which was regarded as a principle, that a client had to come voluntarily in 
order to benefit from casework help’3. The most original, and eventually famous – or 
notorious – paper on this theme was from Clare Winnicott (1962), the social worker 
                                                 
1 Two of the psychoanalytically based articles cited by Vanstone were by Geoffrey Parkinson, a 
probation officer who a few years later became a well-known and outspoken critic of 
psychoanalytically oriented casework, and was a regular columnist (as ‘Tostig’ and later as ‘Tailgunner 
Parkinson’) in the magazine New Society, until it ceased publication in 1987.  
2 In a review article, ‘Out of wedlock’, she says of the book under review that the ‘interpretation here is 
based on psycho-analytic theory, and as such will certainly be provoking to many British social 
workers’. 
3 At the time, of course, offenders on probation, though not those on most forms of after-care, had 
formally consented to their supervision. Foren and Bailey (1968) were later to argue that if authority 
was a problem for casework this applied to settings other than probation (see Raynor and Robinson 
(2005: 58). 
wife of the psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott, and this took an uncompromisingly 
psychoanalytic line. Following in part the argument of her husband in a paper on ‘The 
anti-social tendency’ originally read in 1956 (Winnicott, 1958: 306-15), she argued 
that the element of authority in the relationship, far from being a handicap, was 
essential to its success. She asked:  
 
…are there not theories which teach us that the delinquent is unconsciously 
looking for just this, for a human being to become a respected and controlling 
authority, because this is what he has been deprived of in his family 
relationships? (Winnicott, 1962: 181). 
 
Like her husband, she argued that the anti-social tendency expressed an 
element of hope, ‘and repeats an urge (mainly unconscious) to reinstate what is lost’. 
So: 
 
When a child or an adult commits an offence…he brings into action the 
machinery of the law. The probation officer who is then asked to do casework 
with the client feels he ought to apply techniques implying the casework 
principle of self-determination, but he loses everything if he forgets his 
relationship to his agency and the court, since symptoms of this kind of illness 
are unconsciously designed to bring authority into the picture. The probation 
officer can humanise the machinery of the law but he cannot sidestep it 
without missing the whole point of the symptom and the needs of the client. If 
he does miss the point the client either gives up hope or commits another 
offence to ensure the re-instatement of legal machinery (Winnicott, 1962: 181-
2). 
 
She makes clear that while sociological factors ‘have a bearing’ on delinquency, these 
are in her view secondary to the complex unconscious motivation and needs that she 
describes. The reason that enforced relationships can work, despite what she sees as 
the received wisdom of casework that they cannot, is that they meet the delinquent’s 
unconscious need for a relationship with ‘a human being who is the embodiment of 
the legal machinery of society’s reaction to him…with whom he can gradually come 
to terms’. There is ‘something deep down in the delinquent that comes to meet the 
probation officer’, and this is why probation works, often better than psychiatric 
approaches (Winnicott, 1962: 182). 
 
Winnicott’s delinquent was as fully equipped with an unconscious mind as the 
offenders whose case histories are discussed by Gadd and Farrall (2004), but her 
prescriptions for action on the part of the supervising officer do not include an 
interpretive leap into the hidden depths of the Id. Instead her principal 
recommendation is that the probation officer should remain clear about his or her 
responsibilities as a representative of an agency that is part of the criminal justice 
system4. Put this way, her ideas about the justification for the use of authority by the 
probation officer seem less dated, even if there remains something indefensibly 
confident about her ascription to the offender of unconscious motives. It was, 
however, this latter aspect of her paper that attracted most attention, first favourable 
                                                 
4 I am grateful to my former colleague Alan Cohen for alerting me, many years ago, to the importance 
of this aspect of Winnicott’s paper. 
and then dismissive. Hunt (1964), for example, cited Winnicott’s paper in arguing (in 
a style that repeatedly suggests that he had not completely clarified his ideas for 
himself, let alone for his readers5) that enforcement of court orders was in clients’ 
interests, though, by virtue of their immaturity, they would not appreciate this; 
appreciation that it had been in their interests all along would come with greater 
maturity (see Raynor and Robinson (2005: 57-8) for a satirical but not unfair 
summary of Hunt’s argument). There is no doubt that Winnicott’s assumption that 
offending is a symptom of some kind of illness, if applied with sufficient unself-
critical confidence, could lead to a grotesque denial of the reality of clients’ accounts 
of their problems and experiences. But it seems unlikely that it ever was generally 
applied in such a way in the probation service: the accounts of this kind of approach 
in action are more often about relatively specialised voluntary sector agencies, such as 
the Family Welfare Association (Mayer and Timms, 1970). It was this organisation 
that Parkinson (1970: 220-21) had in mind when he wrote: ‘Clients tried to talk about 
the gas bill, workers tried to talk about the client’s mother. Perceptive clients got the 
gas bill paid by talking about mother’6. 
 
The complaint here is that psychoanalytically oriented casework is ineffective 
because irrelevant, and this was a main theme of the critique of social work that 
emerged in the mid to late 1960s from a newly critical sociology of deviance, 
influenced in varying degrees by the labelling perspective and by Marxism (for 
example, Becker, 1963; Matza, 1964). The influence of sociology (which only 
became a widely accessible discipline at undergraduate level in Britain in the late 
1960s) was, as Raynor and Robinson (2005: 70) note, helpful for many social workers 
and probation officers, in making them more aware of the policy context of their work 
with individuals and of the potentially damaging effect of stigmatising official labels. 
The problem was that sociological explanations were often advanced as replacements 
of rather than complements to more established accounts based on individual 
biographies or family interactions, presenting social workers and probation officers 
with an either/or choice, rather than the ‘psychosocial’ blend advocated much later by 
Jefferson (2002a). On a note of personal reminiscence, the sociological critique gave 
me an answer to one of my supervisors of the early 1970s, who argued that young 
men’s tendency to commit domestic burglaries could be understood in terms of their 
need to break through sexually symbolic barriers: the obvious response was that it was 
unclear why such Oedipal passions should be common on poor council estates and 
almost unknown on affluent private ones. Later work, some of it psychoanalytically 
based, on hegemonic and subordinated masculinities (e.g. Jefferson, 2002b; 
Messerschmidt, 1993) could provide the outline of an answer to this argument, but at 
the time none was forthcoming. The problem with this sociological line of 
explanation, of course, was that its prescriptions for practical action of a kind 
available to probation officers were not transparent: if criminal behaviour arose from 
economic inequality and social deprivation, the solution could only lie in political 
action to promote social and economic justice, to which probation officers’ 
                                                 
5 The paper is often unintentionally obscure, and (Hunt, 1964: 243) misleadingly cites ‘Melitta 
Schmideberg, with her psycho-analytic experience and orientation’. This is misleading because 
Schmideberg was by this time an outspoken critic of psychoanalysis as a basis for casework or 
anything else. But she was the daughter of Melanie Klein, and in that sense certainly had a 
psychoanalytic background.  
6 Cohen (1972: 42-44) provides an extended example of this kind of exchange. 
contribution could at best be only modest (see, for example, Drakeford and Vanstone 
(1996) for some later attempts to state what it might be).  
 
Client-probation officer transactions 
 
Hunt (1964) was unusual among writers of the 1960s in citing Winnicott (1962) in a 
discussion of the relationship between helping and the use of authority in probation; 
even Foren and Bailey (1968) made only passing reference to her paper, and 
subsequent articles in Case Conference (Caudell, 1964; Rees and Burke, 1966) that 
adopted a position on agency function not unlike Winnicott’s do not acknowledge her 
work. Neither does the author who made what is to my mind the most original and 
persuasive connections between psychoanalytic writings on casework and practice in 
the probation setting – Bill Jordan, whose early work, as W.J.O. Jordan and then 
William Jordan, involved close attention to interactions between client and worker, 
and in particular to the emotional content of their relationship7. Insight into oneself 
and one’s feelings, as recommended by Christie (1997), was central to Jordan’s 
approach. He outlined his ideas in two Case Conference articles (Jordan, 1968a; 
1968b) before developing them at greater length in two books in the ‘Library of 
Social Work’ series (Jordan, 1970; 1972).  
 
Jordan’s two main explicit influences, apart from his own experiences of 
practice, were the psychoanalytic work of the Family Discussion Bureau, later the 
Institute of Marital Studies, at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, and the 
more ‘systemic’ approach to family therapy represented at the time by Ackerman 
(1966) and Satir (1967). Another influence was the work on family interaction of R.D. 
Laing and his associates in the ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement (e.g. Laing, 1965; Laing 
and Esterson, 1964), of which more below. Jordan’s approach to each of these 
sources, which he had obviously studied carefully, was to state where his views, 
developed from his practice experiences, differed from the dominant account – a 
method that seems exemplary as a means of making sense in a different context of 
ideas developed in a particular therapeutic setting. The first Case Conference article 
(Jordan, 1968a: 470-1) argued that probation officers often failed to challenge clients’ 
accounts of their and their families’ problems because of their fear that clients would 
be unable to use insights into the emotional origins and consequences of their actions. 
Jordan wrote of his own fear that the result of any challenge to the client’s account 
might be murder or suicide, and suggests that if such melodramatic terrors are felt by 
the worker this is likely to be ‘a reflection of the client’s feelings’; if the worker has 
apparently irrational fears this may be because these are what the client is 
communicating. The paper also introduced the idea of ‘centrifugal’ families, which 
was to be developed in Jordan (1972), characterised by intense peer-group 
involvement on the part of teenage children and a tendency, actual or threatened, on 
the part of the parents to flee from the emotional pressures of family interaction. This, 
the typical pattern, according to Jordan, in families of delinquents, is unlike that 
described in the work of family therapists, and opposite to the ‘integrative’ pattern 
described by Laing and Esterson (1964) as typical of the families of young women 
diagnosed as schizophrenic. 
 
                                                 
7 Later Jordan went on to address major themes of political economy, welfare and social justice, among 
others, while never completely cutting himself off from his roots in probation practice. 
The second article (Jordan, 1968b) anticipated the arguments of his first book 
(Jordan, 1970), and more explicitly confronted his dissatisfaction with the theories 
and descriptions of family interaction to be found in the work of writers associated 
with the Institute of Marital Studies. Compared with classical psychoanalysis, the 
work of the Institute was less concerned with internal personality structure and more 
with the unconscious emotional content of interpersonal action and communication, 
reflecting the influence of D.W. Winnicott and other theorists who placed a central 
emphasis on the importance of ‘object relations’ for emotional growth. The ideas of 
Anna Freud (1937) were particularly influential (e.g. Guthrie and Mattinson, 1971), 
with their stress on the ego’s unconscious defences against anxiety, including 
repression, denial, splitting, projection, introjection and projective identification. 
Jordan (1968b: 299) developed this relational focus, arguing for a less static and 
internal and more interactive and dynamic view of the unconscious than in classic 
psychoanalytic theory, and for attention to be paid to ‘processes of 
interaction…between what is unconscious in one person and conscious in another’. 
The interaction between family members, for Jordan, was often more important than 
the personality structure of the individuals involved. ‘Furthermore, methods of 
casework which deal with family interaction may be involving unconscious material 
to a much greater extent than has been suggested’ (Jordan, 1968b: 301).  
 
In Client-Worker Transactions (1970) and The Social Worker in Family 
Situations (1972) Jordan took these ideas further. First, he stressed that the social 
worker is unlikely to be able to maintain the detached, analytical role prescribed in 
traditional writing about casework and family therapy. The traditional approach is 
‘like describing the game of cricket purely from the bowler’s point of view’ (Jordan, 
1970: 46)8, and accounts of family therapy are characterised by ‘a certain beguiling 
simplicity, almost amounting to naivety, in some…descriptions of the therapist’s role’ 
(Jordan, 1972: 7). Jordan reminds us that batsmen not only try to make it difficult for 
bowlers to get them out but also want to score runs off them; that is, the client as well 
as the worker ‘has aims and plans and things he is trying to do’ (Jordan, 1970: 45), 
and these may include getting the worker to carry feelings that the client finds 
unbearable. The second main point of Jordan’s divergence from the established 
approach of psychoanalytic writing on casework is that he suggests we should think in 
terms of emotional ‘transactions’ rather than of projection. In the classic account, 
what is projected is unconscious phantasy material; in Jordan’s account, the 
‘transaction’ comes about as a result of a ‘defensive manoeuvre’ by the client, and 
what is unconsciously transmitted from client to worker are feelings that the client 
finds intolerable, unmanageable or too uncomfortable to allow into consciousness. 
The worker rather than the marital partner or another family member (as in the 
Institute of Marital Studies version) becomes the recipient of these unconsciously 
communicated emotions, and a good indication that this has happened is that the 
worker begins to feel and behave in unaccustomed and exaggerated ways, for example 
by being ‘very angry or very frightened, very protective or very rejecting’ (Jordan, 
1970: 46).  
 
Thirdly, and here the argument returns to the issues about agency function 
raised by Winnicott (1962), Jordan diverges from what he sees as the accepted theory 
in arguing that the emotional content of the relationship between client and worker is 
                                                 
8 Jordan was himself an accomplished cricketer, specialising in spin bowling. 
not (as in the psychoanalytic model) made up of unconscious infantile desires and 
conflicts, and quite distinct from the supposedly adult and rational seeking of help 
with a social problem; instead it is embedded ‘within the social problem presented and 
the manner of its presentation’. This is because ‘a social work agency invites people 
to express themselves to it in the form of a social problem’; that is, agency function 
shapes the way the problem is presented, and this means among other things that the 
differences between social workers and psychoanalysts are greater than the 
differences between their respective clients (Jordan, 1970: 5-6). The case discussions 
Jordan gives later in this book and in his later work generally show workers behaving 
in a firm, even directive, manner, as one would expect from his stress on the 
importance of the fact that the social worker – who in Jordan’s early work is always a 
probation officer – works within an agency context that represents a set of social 
expectations and requirements. Once workers have understood what part of what they 
are feeling comes from clients’ transmission of unmanageable emotions, they can and 
should begin behaving in a way that reflects the agency’s priorities and social 
purposes. 
 
The psychoanalytic perspectives of the Institute of Marital Studies and related 
work were thus radically reworked by Jordan, but it remains true that these 
perspectives provided the starting-point for his understanding both of family 
interactions and of what goes on in the relationship between worker and client. The 
same debt to psychoanalysis remains in the work of the ‘anti-psychiatrists’ Laing, 
Cooper and Esterson, whose influence appears particularly in Jordan’s second book 
(Jordan, 1972). Given the fame Laing and his colleagues achieved in counter-cultural 
circles in the second half of the 1960s, it is perhaps surprising that relatively little 
trace of their work is to be found in writing specifically on social work, then or later. 
Their claim that ‘madness’, and schizophrenia in particular, could be understood and 
made intelligible through a careful analysis of patterns of family interaction and 
communication, created space for a social rather than a medical approach to 
treatment, and thus possibilities for social work intervention. In practice, what Jordan 
and others took from ‘anti-psychiatry’ was very much what they also took from more 
orthodox psychoanalytic approaches: a sense of the need for close attention to patterns 
of communication in families, to what went unsaid as well as what was said, and to 
the impact of intervention on the worker’s feelings and responses. Apart from this, the 
influence of the ‘anti-psychiatrists’ was probably felt most in the field of family 
therapy, because of the overlap between their thinking and that of family systems 
theorists and therapists (e.g. Walrond-Skinner, 1976). The more opaque philosophical 
pronouncements of Laing and his colleagues, typically a mixture of psychoanalysis, 
Hegelianism, Marxism, existentialism and mysticism, remained inaccessible to all but 
a few co-believers9. 
                                                 
9 Sigal (2005a: 31), who was closely associated with Laing, Cooper and Esterson in the early 1960s, 
gives this example (among others) in his funny and moving novel based on this experience: ‘Within a 
micro-social nexus the holistic hungers of the community members dialectically reinforce my 
narcissistic violence, but produce a negation of a negation in which we abduct one another from our 
arbitrary roles. Thus a wholly new politics emerges: an anti-imperialism of the mind’. This is the 
lightly fictionalised David Cooper, speaking of Villa 21, his experiment in democratic psychiatry. 
According to Sigal (2005a: 34), he spoke more plainly when he had been drinking, describing Villa 21 
as ‘the last chance for some of those kids. Maybe I can help a few make it.’ Sigal (2005b) quotes a 
therapist who believed (in 2005) that Laing and his colleagues had brought about only cosmetic 
changes in the psychiatric system, in the direction of greater humanity and respect for patients, but that 
there are still ‘Laing- and Esterson-influenced doctors, probation officers, psychologists, who are out 
Back to the 1960s? 
 
So far I have tried to identify some possible virtues in the practice (or at least the 
practice that was written about) of the probation officers of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
and to show how themes that appear in their writing are similar to those identified as 
important in some recent criminological work. But nostalgia would be an unreliable 
basis on which to establish preferences for policy and practice, and it needs to be 
acknowledged that the efforts of these probation officers led to (among other things) 
the IMPACT report (Folkard et al., 1976) and the famous overall conclusion that, 
when it comes to interventions intended to make offenders less likely to go on 
offending, ‘nothing works’ (Martinson, 1974). This is not the place to repeat a story 
that is now well known (and well summarised recently in Raynor and Robinson 
(2005)), but even when all due qualifications have been made about Martinson’s 
conclusion, about the methodological problems inherent in the IMPACT experiment, 
and about the existence of contradictory, more encouraging, findings (Shaw, 1974), 
the conclusion is inescapable that psychoanalytically oriented casework was unable to 
show that (in general) it ‘worked’ in the sense of helping its clients to become less 
prone to commit offences. Any claim, therefore, that we might have something to 
learn from those who practised it needs to be made with due caution and modesty10.  
 
 If the rediscovery of psychoanalysis by criminologists reflects a justified sense 
that there were important gaps in the sociological explanations that dominated the 
discipline for almost forty years, a reasonable conclusion on the failures of 
psychoanalytically oriented casework in probation might be that it was the techniques 
and processes of intervention, rather than psychoanalytic theory itself, that were the 
problem (Keat, 1981). To put the point simply and concretely, not everyone could (or 
can) practise with the intensity, commitment and sensitivity of a William Jordan, or so 
subtly adapt psychoanalytic concepts to the probation context. There remains 
something heroic and admirably democratic about the efforts of pioneering social 
workers to derive from psychoanalytic theory forms of practice that were feasible in 
poor neighbourhoods and potentially helpful to deprived, marginalised people 
(Martinez-Brawley and Zorita, 1998), but there also remains a question about how far 
they succeeded. So the potentially helpful messages from the probation practices 
discussed here do not include a recommendation that officers should attempt to turn 
offenders into subjects for psychoanalysis. Instead, they might be summarised as 
follows: attend closely to what clients say, how they say it, and what they do not say; 
be aware of the emotional as well as the rational, cognitive content of communication; 
be sensitive to the emotional effects clients have on you, the worker (because your 
relationship with the client may be shaped by feelings of which neither of you is fully 
aware); try to see clients in the context of their relationships, past as well as present; 
                                                                                                                                            
there working, quietly, in the field’. Laing’s enthusiasm for the mind-enhancing qualities of LSD is a 
central theme of Sigal (2005a), but for obvious reasons this aspect of his practice never had any official 
influence on social work. An interesting exception is ‘Lady Almoner’ (1960), who took LSD (then still 
used therapeutically) while working in a psychiatric hospital. She seems to have had a good time, and 
afterwards minded less when she was taken for a patient. Her article provoked no comment in the pages 
of Case Conference.  
10 There are also, of course, important contextual differences between the 1960s and the present, of 
which the most obvious is probably the increase in the availability of hard drugs and in their use by 
known offenders (Bennett, 2000). But the probation service had its origins in concerns about substance 
misuse (Vanstone, 2004), so the link between offending and unwise or compulsive consumption is not 
a new problem for practitioners.  
have respect for the complexity and ambiguity of clients’ emotions, just as you have 
respect for the complexity and ambiguity of your own emotions, and the emotions of 
those who are close to you; and remain aware that emotions, which may be 
unconscious or unacknowledged, can be as important in shaping action as conscious, 




As suggested at the start of this paper, these recommendations, derived from writing 
of the past, are compatible with much more recent trends in criminology. Some of this 
recent work is explicitly psychoanalytical in inspiration (Gadd and Farrall, 2004; 
Jefferson, 2002b), and some draws on different traditions in social science while still 
affirming the importance of emotions, not always conscious, and of relationships 
(Braithwaite, 1989, 2001: Scheff, 1994, 1997). For instance, Braithwaite’s theory of 
reintegrative shaming, developed and refined since its original formulation in 1989, 
emphasises the centrality of the emotion of shame, actual or anticipated, in social life, 
and in particular in securing conformity with social norms and helping offenders to 
acknowledge the harm they have done and the hurt they have caused, so that they can 
be re-accepted into communities of care and interdependence. The work on shame of 
Scheff (1994, 1997) and Retzinger (1991), developed in the different context of 
understanding conflict and violence, is, as I have argued elsewhere (Smith, 2006), 
important not only for understanding the roots of violence but for suggesting ways 
violence and hostility in which might be reduced.   
 
 These developments in criminology are in turn compatible with recent 
research on ‘what works’ in probation. This has stressed the importance of the quality 
of the individual relationships offenders have with their probation officers, and of 
their emotional content (Rex, 1999). Positive relationships, in which the officer shows 
commitment and concern, and responds warmly to the offender’s positive 
achievements, while being prepared to be directive and authoritative, are more likely 
to encourage desistance from offending than relationships that are cold, perfunctory, 
or preoccupied with the enforcement of legal requirements. A focus on desistance, 
and on the positive characteristics of offenders who succeed in stopping offending, 
appears in much of this recent work. Farrall (2002), for example, found that ‘social 
capital’, mainly in the form of employment and supportive family relationships, was 
important in achieving desistance, along with motivation on the offender’s part. He 
did not identify elements of probation supervision that may have been important in 
fostering desistance, but the implications of his analysis for helpful practice are clear 
enough: officers should focus on strengths, not only on failings and risks, and look 
beyond the individual offender to his or her social circumstances and relationships. 
Maruna (2000) stressed the importance of emotions in the process of desistance, or 
failure to desist: offenders who were able to stop offending were motivated by hope, 
optimism, and confidence, and were able to conceive of themselves in essentially 
positive terms, as active agents rather than as doomed creatures of unfortunate 
circumstances. Maruna (see also Maruna et al., 2004) argued that authority figures 
such as probation officers could be important in supporting offenders on this path 
towards ‘redemption’, and in valuing their positive achievements.  
 
McNeill (2003, 2004, 2006; see also McNeill et al., 2005) has argued (from a 
Scottish perspective, which may provide a more supportive setting for his arguments 
than exists south of the border) that a ‘desistance paradigm’ (McNeill, 2006; cf. 
Bottoms and McWilliams, 1979) for probation practice would entail a revival of old 
concerns of social work with offenders, such as the quality of the individual 
relationship, individualised plans for change, and attention to the offender’s practical 
needs. McNeill et al. (2005: 2), writing of key skills for practice in a Scottish 
Executive publication (which suggests they have a chance gaining an influential 
readership), describe how a preoccupation with cognitive-behavioural groupwork 
programmes has marginalised ‘more traditional concerns in social work with 
offenders around the quality of relationships involved in supporting change 
processes’. They note that recent reviews of ‘what works’ have begun to include 
among the factors making for constructive change the exercise of professional 
discretion by the worker, so that the approach to supervision is appropriate for the 
offender’s needs, interests, and capacities, and the importance of interpersonal and 
relational skills. This focus on the individual relationship, which McNeill et al. (2005) 
describe as ‘belated’ (in terms of research on effectiveness), is, they note, supported 
by much older research on psychotherapy (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967), which found 
that the kind of person the worker is, or comes across as being, is more important for 
therapeutic success or failure than the theories and methods he or she employs. 
Accurate empathy, respect, warmth and genuineness remain crucial for success, 
allowing a relationship of mutual respect to develop, in which worker and client form 
a ‘working alliance’ to support ‘narrative reconstruction’ by the offender, from a 
narrative of victimhood and failure to one of agency and hope (McNeill et al., 
200511). One might then add to Bottoms’ (2001) reasons for compliance with 
supervision (coercion or constraint, habit, self-interest and a sense of moral 
obligation) the quality of the relationship with the supervising officer, if he or she 
becomes someone whom the offender would rather not let down, and whose good 
opinion the offender values and wishes to keep.   
 
 The reconstruction over the past ten years of the probation service (in England 
and Wales) as something other than a social work agency entails the risk of forgetting 
what may be of positive value in the history of probation practice, as well as what is 
best treated as an example of what to avoid. This paper has argued that for all its 
evident limitations and its sometimes hard-to-defend rationalisations, the 
psychoanalytical orientation of the probation service from (roughly) the mid-1950s to 
the early 1970s contains lessons that remain valuable in thinking about what 
constitutes good practice. This has recently, if indirectly, been recognised in 
criminological research, especially work on criminal careers and desistance, and a 
parallel development in research on effectiveness has similarly rediscovered the 
importance of relationships between workers and clients that can accommodate the 
richness and contradictory complexity of clients’ experiences. At a time when the 
probation service is in the unaccustomed and unwelcome position of being the target 
of hostile criticism from politicians and the press over failures to ‘manage’ violent 
offenders in such a way as to prevent them from committing further serious offences 
(Travis, 2006), the immediate priorities for policy will no doubt be concerned with 
further tightening of standards for risk assessment and supervision, and further 
demands that the service should abide by them. It is unlikely that the question of what 
                                                 
11 In less postmodern language, one might think of this as a process of justified enhancement of self-
esteem, or in Scheff’s (1994, 1997) terms, a move from a state of shame to a state of pride.  
are the components of a helpful and supportive supervisory relationship will feature 
prominently in this scrutiny of the service and its work. But it ought to.    
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